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A Welfare Economic Approach to Growth and Distributio n
In the Dual Economy
I. Introductio n
This paper presents a welfare economic analysis of the distributio nal consequence s
of growth in the dual economy, a problem which has attracted much attention from de
velopment economists of late.

We will explore the similaritie s and differences between

the absolute income and poverty and relative inequality approaches for three stylized
dualistic development models.

It will be shown that these approaches are not always

in agreement and, more disturbingl y, that the most notable discrepancy is found in the
most relevant stylized model--grow th via the transfer of population from a backward
to an enlarging advanced sector.

The fact of these discrepanci es raises the important

question of how to measure changing income distribution in a manner consistent with
the judgments we wish to make about the alleviation of absolute poverty and changes
in relative income inequality.

Recent controversi es over who received the benefits

of growth in two less developed countries-- Brazil and India--are examined in these terms.
II. Three Stylized Models of Dualistic Economic Development
At the forefront of studies of modern economic growth are the dualistic development
models of Lewis [ 24 ] , Fei and Ranis [ 12 ] , and Jorgenson [ 18 ] •

While these models

differ one from another in a number of important respects, they have in common the
division of the economy into a relatively advanced sector and a relatively backward
sector, which we shall call "modern" and "traditiona l" respectivel y.

As with all

dualistic models, the working assumption is that the members of each sector are
relatively similar to others in that sector and relatively differeat from those in
the other sector.

We shall regard the modern sector as synonymous with high wages and

the traditional sector as synonymous with low wages.

"Wage" and "income" will be used

interchanga bly. 1
1-

This is not to downplay the importance of capital and other sources of income and
wealth in determining economic position. Rather, since most people in less developed
countries recei,·e most or all of their income from the work they do, and since
variation in laJor income is the most important source of overall income inequality,
a high wage sector-low wage sector dichotomy would appear more relevant than any other
dualistic classificati on.
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In the two sectors, workers receive wage rates

ii°'

and Wt respectively.

2

vJ1Il > P* > Wt where P* is an agreed-upon absolute poverty line which is constant over
time (except for allowing for price changes).
two sectors are f

m

and f

t

The shares of the labor force in the

respectively; the total economically active population

fm + ft is normalized at 1.

The models that follow differ with respect to the time

paths of vJ1Il, Wt, fm, and ft.
The overall growth of the dualistic economy is decomposable into the sum of
growth in the two sectors.

In turn, each sector's growth (or lack thereof) may be

partitioned into two components:

one attributable to the enlargement (or contraction)

of the sector to include a greater (or lesser) percentage of the economically active
population, the other attributable to the enrichment of persons engaged in that sector.
If a dualistic economy is growing successfully, one or more of the following must be
happening: i) the fraction of workers in the modern sector is increasing; ii) those
in the modern sector receive higher average incomes than before; or iii) the incomes
of those who remain in the traditional sector may rise.

While every successfully

developing country experiences some or all of these phenomena to varying degrees, some
pursue more broadly-based or more egalitarian courses than do others.
To capture the essential differences among the alternative growth paths that
might be followed, we construct models of three stylized development typolor,.1.es.

In

the Modern Sec tor Enlargement Growth model, an economy d.evelops by en1.arging the size
of its modern sector, the wages in the two sectors remaining the same.

Hodern Sector

Enrichment Growth occurs when the growth accrues only to a fixed number of persons in
modern sector, the number in the traditional sector and their wages remaining unchanged.
Finally, we have Traditional Sector Enrichment Growth when all of the proceeds of
2

The assumntion of .identical wages for all workers within a given sect)r is
simply for alg~Jraic and diagrannnatic convenience and is not necessary for any of
the results above. Intrasectoral wage diversity is allowed for in the model in the
Appendix.
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growth are divided evenly among those in the traditional sector. For simplicity, these
are analyzed separately.

The interested reader is invited to explore various combinations.

One interesting possibility is modern sector enlargement accompanied by traditional sector
enrichment, which might arise when the enlargement of the modern sector labor force
leads to competition amongst traditional sector employers for the remaining workers.
In relation to existing literature, the modern sector enlargement growth model
most closely reflects the essential nature of economic development as conceived by
a number of writers., Fei and Ranis [ 12 ] , for example, have written:

" ••• the heart

of the development problem may be said to lie in the gradual shifting of the center
of gravity of the economy from the agricultural to the industrial sector •.. gauged in
terms of the reallocation ofthe.population between the two sectors in order to promote
a gradual expansion of industrial employment and output," and this is echoed by Kuznets
[ 22 ].

Empirical studies of many countries have quantified the absorption of an in

creasing share of the population into the modern sector; see, for instance, Turnham

[ 36 ].

Thus, modern sector enlargement comprises a large and perhaps even predominant

component of the growth of currently-developing countries.
There are also signs of traditional sector enrichment.

The poor in the traditional

sectors have not in general been shown to be worse off in absolute terms, and in many
countries, their absolute economic position is demonstrably improved.

3

Still the

pace of improvement is disappointingly slow, even in the rapidly-growing countries.

4

This may be because substantial elements of modern sector enrichment have taken place
Nearly everywhere, the wages received by upper-level workers (the skilled,

also.

3
In some countries, economic growth has been accompanied by declining relative incom1
inequality, and hence alleviation of absolute poverty; see the studies by Fei, Ranis
and Kuo [13] for Taiwan and Ayub [ 3] for Pakistan. In other countries, relative in
come inequality did not improve, but the overall income growth was large enough to raise
the position of the poor as well; this may be inferred from data contained in the
studies of Argentina, Mexico, and Puerto Rico by Weisskoff [ 37], of Brazil by Fishlow
[16 ], and of Colombia by Berry and Urrutia [ 6 ]. Bardhan's [ 4] country study of
India is the one case I have seen where absolute poverty has been shown to increase in
severity over .ime; undoubtedly other "fourth world countries" share a similar plight.
.
For instance, Fishlow (16] demonstrates that given the existing pattern of income distribution in Brazil, the economy would have to grow at a rate of 5 percent
per year for 20 years before the poor Would attain incomes of $100 per capita.
4

-4government employees, etc.) have risen in real terms.
These wage increases are larger in absolute terms than those
5
received by lower-level workers (the unskilled. self-emoloyed. etr..)
How are we to evaluate these various development typologies?

We turn now to

an analysis of some of the approaches which ~ave been suggested.

III. Absolute and Relative Approaches for Evaluating Growth and Distribution
Economists are used to regarding social welfare as a positive function of the
income levels of then individuals or families in society before and after development
takes place.

In empirical studies, the general social welfare function

(1)

is too general to be useful, and the Pareto criterion

... '

(2)

is too stringent.
For analytical ease, the information contained in the income vector (Y 1 Y2 ... Yn)
is usually collapsed into one or more aggregative measures.

The three classes of

measures in most conunon use are total income (Y) or its per capita equivalent, indices
of relative inequality (I), and measures of absolute poverty (P).
The customary approach to studies of distribution and development is to posit
(explicitly or implicitly) a social welfare function containing an index of relative
inequality as one of its arguments:

5

These conclusions are drawn from Berg [ 5 ). He also presents evidrnce
that while ski.led-unskilled wage differences widened, skilled-unskilled wage ratios
have general!} narrowed.
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w

(3)

where Y is total income and I is an indicator in inequality in its distribution.

In

what follows, this type of welfare judgment will be termed the "relative inequality
approach."

Theoretical support for this approach may be found in the welfare

economics literature in the writings of Sheshinski [ 32) and Sen [31 ].

In the study

of distribution and development, exemplary of the relative inequality approach is the
Nobel Prize winning work of Professor Kuznets [20) [21 ], begun
two decades ago.

Income distribution is said to have 'improved' or 'worsened' according

to Lorenz domination (i.e. , whether one Lorenz curve lies wholly above or below a previoui
one (L)) or according to one or more measures of relative inequality, such as the income
share of the poorest 40% (S) or the Gini coefficient (G).

Thus,relative inequality

studies typically make one or more of the following judgments:

(4)

(a) W = f(Y, L), fl> O,
(b) W

=

f (Y, S) , fl > 0

(c) W = f(Y, G), fl> O,

f 2 > 0,
f

2 " 0,

£

2 < 0.

A great many studies have made use of this framework.

Some of the most influencial

recent contributions, which include extensive surveys and bibliographies of prior re
search studies, are those of Cline [10 ], Chenery et. al. [ 9 ], and Adelman and Morris
[ 1 ].

As an alternative to the relative inequality approach, some wri,;rs have examined
the income distribution itself, assigning a lower social welfare weight to income gains
of the relatively well-off as compared with the poor.

With no loss of generality, we

may order then income recipient units from lowest to highest.

The general class of

studies which treats social welfare in the form:
(5)

g. > g. ¥
1

J

i < j

shall be termed the "absolute income approach."

In the development literature, the

studies of Little and Mirrlees (25 ], Atkinson [

2], and Stern [33] are notable
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'
examples.

As an extreme version of (5), Rawls [27 ] has proposed the maximin principle,

i.e., maximizing the income of the worst-off person in the economy:
(5')

Finally, for some purposes, we may wish to define a poverty line P* and concentrate
our attention on the group in poverty to the exclusion of the rest of the income dis
tribution.

This practice, termed the "absolute poverty approach," is common in studies

of growth in the United States; see, for example, Bowman [

7) or Perlman [26 ].

De

noting the extent of poverty by P, absolute poverty studies hold that

W = h (P), h'

(6)

O.

<

Usual measures of poverty are the number of individuals or families whose incomes are
below that line or the gap between the poverty line and the average among the poor.
In a paper just published, Sen [30 ] combines these and argues elegantly for the use of
an index n = H[I + (1 -

I)

G ], where His the head-count of the poor, I is the average
p

income shortfall of the poor, and G

p

the poor.
(7)

is the Gini coefficient of income inequality among

Thus, alternative. forms of the absolute poverty approach are given by:
(a)

W = h (H), h'

(b) W

=

<

O,

h (I), h' < 0,

(c) W = h (n)

=

h [H[I + (1

I)

G ] ] , h' < 0.
p

It is not necessary that the relative and absolute approaches be regarded as
mutually exclusive.

In the following section, we formulate a more general welfare

function combining these various approaches.
IV. A General Welfare Approach for Assessing Dualistic Development
The vario13 welfare approaches of Section III wete originated largely in a static
context.

However, since the distribution of benefits in the course of economic de-

-7-

velopment refers to a phenomenon that takes place over time, it is appropriately
measured by a dynamic index.
dynamic measure.

It is important, therefore, to establish a suitably

We now posit a general welfare function and a number of properties

of that welfare function which are desirable for this purpose.
Consider a welfare function of the form:
(8)

W

=

W(Y , I , P) •

In the dualistic development models of Section II, total income (Y) is given by:
(9)

Whichever measure of relative inequality (I) one chooses is functionally related to
the distribution of the labor force between the two sectors and the intersectoral wage
structure:

(10)
The poverty index (P) depends on the wage in the traditional sector and/or the share
of the population in that sector:
(11)
Substituting (9) - (11) into (8), we have:
(12)

which we term the "general welfare approach."
We must now specify the relationship between Wand its various arguments.
line with the considerations discussed in Section III, it is desirable to posit:
(A)

aw

-> 0
ay

In
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(B)

(C)

aW

IT<

aW

aP

<

O

o.

Condition (A) relies for its validity on the assumption tha.t the basic goal. of an

'

economic system is to maximize the output of goods and services received by each of
its members.

We should be clear that acceptance of the judgment

aw
y
3

0 does not

>

W > O Vi, whi c h i n our
requi re us to accept t he stronger quas i -Pareto condition af y

aw

dualitic development roodels becomesay

>

0, k

z

m, t.

i

(This is quasi because

it is

k

formulated in terms of incomes rather than utilities).

The judgment ; -~ > 0 is one
m

which many observers would not want to make, since it implies that even

if the

richest were the sole beneficiaries of economic growth, society would be deemed better
off.

No such judgment is imposed in what follows.
Condition (B) requires us first to define what we mean by a more equal relative

distribution of income.

A generally-accepted (although incomplete) criterion is

that one distribution A is more equal than another B if A Lorenz-dominates B, i.e.,
if A's Lorenz curve lies above B's at at least one point and never lies belm·c it.
If A Lorenz-dominates B for the same level of income, it means distribution A
can be obtained from distribution B by transfering positive amounts of income from
the relatively rich to the relatively poor. 6

The judgment that such transfers improve

social welfare dates back at least to Dalton [ 11] in 1920.

One possible justification

for this principle is diminishing marginal utility of income, coupled with independent
and homothetic individual utility functions and an additively separable social welfare
.
7
f unction.

But these assumptions are not neccesary for the affirmation of the

aw

j udgrnen t a1 < 06

See Rothschild and Stiglitz [ 29 ] and Fields and Fei [ 14 ] .
7
See Atkinson
2] .

axiomatic
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The difficulty with Lorenz-domination as a defining criterion for judgments
concerning relative inequality is its incompleteness.
there is nothing to say.

When Lorenz curves cross,

We therefore require a more complete relative inequality

measure in order to rank various income distributions when Lorenz curves intersect.
For this purpose, many indices of relative income inequality which provide complete
. orderings have been constructed.
The properties of various inequality indices have been examined by a number of
writers (e.g., Champernowne [ 8 ], Kondor [19 ], Szal and Robinson [35 ], and Fields
and Fei [14 ]).
properties:
then

It is agreed that a "good" inequality index should have the following

scale irrelevance (if one distribution is a scalar multiple of another,

they have the same relative inequality), symmetry (if one distribution is a

permutation of another, then relative inequality in the two cases is the same), and
the Daltonian condition (if one distribution is obtained from another by one or more
income transfers from a relatively rich person to a relatively poor one, then the
first distribution is more equal than the second).
Three other properties of relative inequality measures are desirable for analyzing
the growth of a dualistic economy.

These are:

(D)

(E) . cl ,I

> 0

a .vfl
These accord with our intuitive notions about relative inequality (in terms of

vf1 -

Wt or vfl;wt) and will probably not strike the reader as unusual.
(F)

cl I
-= -

This condition holds that when an increasing fraction of the economically active
population is drawn into an enlarged modern sector, then ceteris paribus, relative
I

inequality should be no greater than before.

Since the wage differential between

modern and traditional sector workers is being held constant, this is hardly an
unreasonable property.

ar = 0,

clfm

Many would wish to go one step further and replace (F) by:
which I myself prefer.

The choice between (F)

and (F') has no bearing on any of the results that follow; what is important is the

exclusion of

aI
a ft

-

-

m

aI
-

<

o.

Note that conditions (F) and (F') describe how the

inequality index itself varies with the level of development.· This does not mean that

our f~elings about inequality are invariant to income level.

For a perceptive analysis

of changing tolerance for inequality in the course of economic development, see
Hirschn:iirn and Rothschild [ 17 ] .
Finally, we turn to condition (C), which holds that social welfare (W) is in
creased the less absolute poverty (P) there is.

Whatever poverty measure(s) we employ

should satisfy the properties:

(H)

U
aw

t

<

o.

These conditions state that

absolute poverty Pis reduced if there are fewer

people in the low-income traditional sector and/or if the wage received by those in
the traditional sector is increased, i.e., they become less poor.

These concepts are

equivalent to rhe 'poverty population' and 'poverty gap' notions used in s·~udies of
the United States and the 'headcount' and 'income shortfall' components of the poverty
measure proposed by Sen [30 ].

The appeal of these properties is intuitive and re-
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quires no further elaboration.
Function (12) and conditions (A) - (H) constitute the "general welfare approach."
Condition (B) may be modified to
(B')

for

~ .. 0

aI

observers only interested in absolute poverty, while (C) might be replaced by
(C')

~ = 0

aP

for those concerned only about relative inequality.

The various approaches for

analyzing growth and distribution in the dual economy are summarized in Table 1.
As they stand, the welfare functions (4), (5),

(7), and (12) are purely static.

They are, however, easily made dynamic by differentiating (or differencing) them with
respect to time or to their underlying arguments.
involves changes in

r/11,

and/or f

m

t

and f .

The g·rowth of the dualistic economy

These factors enter directly ~nto (12),

indirectly into the others.
The question that then arises is whether the various approaches always give
the same qualitative answer when evaluating the distributional consequences of various
types of dualistic economic development or whether the judgments differ and, if so,
when.

We address this question in Section V.

V. Distribution and Development:

A Welfare Economic Analysis

This section analyzes the growth and distributional patterns which arise in each
of the three stylized models of dualistic development according to the various welfare
economic approaches previously discussed.

The principal results are summarized in

Table 2.
A. Traditional Sector Enrichment Growth
In the traditional sector enrichment growth model, incomes in the traditional
sector are assumed to rise, incomes in the modern sector remain the same, and the

-12TABLE 1.

VARIOUS WELFARE ECONOMIC APPROACHES FOR ANALYZING
DUALISTIC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Relative Inequality Ap_proach
General Form:

(3)

W = f(Y, I), f

1

> 0, f

2

<

0 •••

Inequality index

Specific Applications:

(4)

(a)

w = f(Y,L), f >
1

0, f2 > 0

Lorenz criterion

(b)

w,:: f (Y, S), fl>

0, f2 > 0

Income share of poorest

0, £2 < 0

Gini coefficient

(c) w'"' f(Y,G), fl

:>

Absolute Income Approach
General Form:

(5)

Specific Application:(5 ')

W = g(Y ), g' > 0
1

Rawlsian maximin criterion

Absolute Poverty Approach
General Form

(6)

w = h(P), h'

Specific
Application•:

(7)

(a) W = h(H), h' < 0

Headcount of poor

(b)W=h(I), h' < 0

Income shortfall

(c) W = h(1r), h' < 0,

Sen index

1r

<

0

••• Poverty index

= H[I + (1-I)G]
p

General Social Welfare Approach
General Form:

(8)

Sp-ecific
Applications:

(12)

aW

w = w(y' I' p ) , fy

>

O'

a .W
aI

<

0,

a~
a ·P

<

0 ... General welfare

Ge..eral welfare,
dualistic

a .Y a:Y a y a Y
, ' , a ~ a wt a fm a ft

o- I

>

aP
a wt

< 0,

a~

o, a I
a wt

aP
a ft

<

> 0,

o, a I = o I
a fm
a ft

< 0.

~

0,
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allocation of the labor force between the two sectors also remains the same.

The

following proposition is easily established:
Proposition 1.

Traditional sector enrichment growth results in higher income,

a more equal relative distribution of income, and less poverty.
The increase in income and the alleviation of poverty (since each of the poor
becomes less poor) are evident.

Regarding the relative income distribution, we need

only observe that traditional sector enrichment growth has the effect of shifting the
kink point on the Lorenz curve vertically as in Figure 1:
Percent of
1
income

Figure 1

Percent of
population
40%
which establishes Lorenz domination.

By inspection, it is apparent that the income

share of the poorest 40% (S) increases and the Gini coefficient (G) (the ratio of the
area above the Lorenz curve to the entire triangle) decreases.
inequality declines, as was to be shown.

Hence, relative income

By all of the social welfare criteria pre

sented above, this type of growth therefore results in an unambiguous welfare improvem~nt.
B. Modern Sector Enrichment Growth
In modern sector enrichment growth, incomes in the modern sector rise, while
incomes in the traditional sector and the allocation of the labor force between the
modern sector and the traditional sector remain the same.

In this case, we have the

following theorem:
Proposition 2.

Modern sector enrichment growth results in higher income, a less

-14-

equal relative distribut ion of income, and no change in poverty.
Adherents of the more general form of the absolute income approach would regard
this type of growth as an unambiguo us improvem ent, although they would have preferred
a pattern where less of the benefit accrued to the well-to-d o.

However, Rawlsians

and persons who adopt the absolute poverty criterion would be indiffere nt to this
type of growth, since no poverty is being alleviate d.
With respect to relative inequalit y, the gap between the modern sector wage and
the tradition al sector wage increases .

The kink point on the Lorenz curve shifts

verticall y downward:

/
I

Percent of
income

/

·/

Figure 2

Percent of

l

40%

_____ l---· . ___________ j populatio n
ft

In Figure 2, we see clearly the Lorenz-i nferiority of the new situation comp~red with
the old, the rising Gini coefficie nt, and the falling share of the poorest 40%.

Those

concerned with relative inequalit y would give positive weight to the growth in income
but negative weight to the rising relative inequalit y.

Thus, the judgments rendered

by the various welfare economic approache s are in disagreem ent.
crepancy is not entirely undesirab le.

The observed dis-

It is quite plausible that some observers may

wish to ,regard the rising gap between the rich and poor unfavorab ly, not because the
poor have lower incomes, but rather because the growing income different icl might
make the poor ieel worse off.

Some might even wish to allow envy of the ri_h by the

poor to more than offset the gain in utility of the income recipient s themselve s.

-15-

This is a defensible position--that income growth concentrated exclusively in the
hands of the rich might be interpreted as a socially inferior situation as compared
with the rich having less and the poor the same amount--but certaialy an extreme
one based on the primacy of relative income considerations.

In the case of modern

sector enrichment growth, therefore, the differing judgments according to the welfare
functions (4), (5), (7), and (12) reflect a true difference of opinion.
This is not so in the case of modern sector enlargement growth, to which we now
turn.
C. Modern Sector Enlargement Growth
As described by a number of leading writers in the field, countries develop
principally by absorbing an increasing share of their labor forces into an ever-en
larging modern sector.

As a stylized version of this, in the modern sector enlarge

ment growth model, incomes in both the modern and the traditional sectors remain the
same but the modern sector gets bigger.

In this case, we may derive the following

results:
Proposition 3.

In modern sector enlargment growth:

and absolute poverty is reduced.

(a) Absolute incomes rise

(b) The Rawlsian criterion shows no change.

Lorenz curves always cross, so relative inequality effects are ambiguous.

(c)

(d) Relative

inequality indices first increase and subsequently decline.
Proofs: (a) The proofs of the absolute income and absolute poverty effects are
immediate.

Clearly, absolute incomes are higher, and since there are fewer poor,

poverty is alleviated.
(b) In modern sector enlargement growth, there are fewer poor, but those who
remain poor continue to be just as poor as before.

Until poverty is totally eliminated,

the Rawlsian criterion is completely insensitive to modern sector enlargement growth.
(c) The crossing of Lorenz curves is demonstrated in Figure 3.
is:

The explanation

(i) Those among the poor who are left behind due to the incapacity of the modern

-16sector to absorb everyone have the same incomes, but these incomes are now a smaller
fraction of a larger total, so the new Lorenz curve lies below the old Lorenz curve
at the lower end of the income distribution; (ii) Each person in the modern sector
receives the same absolute income as before, but the share going to the richest f~ %
is now smaller, and hence the new Lorenz curve lies above the old one at the upper
end of the income distribution; (iii) Therefore, the two curves necessarily cross
somewhere in the middle.
Percent of
income

/

Figure 3

:e=::::======--~~:_~_
._ fr _J

Percent of
population

--i

I-- f m

.---4

2

Of course, when Lorenz curves cross, welfare judgments based on relative inequality
considerations are ambiguous.
(d) We shall now dernenstrate the inevitability of an initial increase in relative
inequality in the early stages of development followed by a subsequent decline for
the income share of the poorest 40% (S) and the Gini coefficient (G).

This is called

the inverted-U hypothesis.
Considering S first, it is evident that in the early stages of ~odern sector
enlargement growth, the poorest 40% receive the same absolute amount from a larger
whole, and therefore their share falls.

However, in the later stages (i.e., for ft< 40%),

they receive all of the income growth and hence their share rises.
be generalized as follows:

This result may

If our measure of inequality is the share of income accruing

to the poorest X%, that share falls continuously until the modern sector has grown
to include (1-X)% of the population.

-178
Turning now to the Gini coefficient, the proof is given in footnote 8.
While both measures exhibit the inverted-U pattern in modern sector enlargement
growth, the turning points do not coinciqe.

There are three phases:

(I) Initially, both G and S show rising relative inequality; (II) Then, G turns
down while S continues fo fall; (III) Finally, S rises while G continues to fall.
To indicate the importance of this discrepancy for just these two measures, it is
thought that in real terms the modern sector-traditional sector wage gap is something
8

The formula for the Gini coefficient in our dualistic model is:
G = 1 - [Wt+ Wm - Wt)(fm)2]
[Wt+ (if! - Wt)frn]

(13)

(13) is a quadratic function.

By inspection, G = 0 when f

m

= 0 and f

m

Thus, the Gini coefficient follows an inverted-U path.

if O < fm < 1.

=

1 and G > O

To determine the

location of the maximum, find

= { [w°' - Wt]

}
} {-2f~t + Wt
-(fm) 2(Wm-Wt)
[Wt+ (if1-wt)fm)]2

and equate the result to zero.

Since the first term in brackets is strictly positive,

we need only work with the second term.

Setting it equal to zero and applying the

m

quadratic formula to solve for f , we find

It is evident that one of the roots, (fm)C =
rejected.

Considering now the other root,

the fact that

if1

>

-wt-W

is negative, so must be
-ifl--w-t--(-fm) = .frJnwt_wt
C

Wm-Wt

Wt implies both numerator and denominator are positive and therefore
<

r.f1,

and therefore (fm) C < 1.

G achieves an economically-meaningful critical value at

/ w'1wt _ wt

,

Thus,

'
like 3:1.
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This implies that Phase II ranges from 37% to 60% of the population in the

traditional sector.

This range is substantial and may well include many LDCs.

In 1955, Kuznets [20 ] demonstrated this pattern in the historical experiences
of a number of then-developed economies.

Kuznets' explanation was that the inverted

U pattern was caused by the transfer of wor~ers from the rural sector, where incomes
were relatively equally distributed at low levels, to the urban sector, where there
was greater income dispersion, owing to the presence of a skilled professional class
at the top and poor recent migrants at the bottom.

In terms of the development

typologies analyzed above, Kuznets' model is basically one of modern sector enlargement
growth with within-sector inequality.
In the Appendix, I extend the dualistic development models of this paper to allow
for within-sector inequality.

There, I prove that the inverted-U pattern always

arises in modern sector enlargement growth, even if the traditional sector has a
more unequal distribution of income within it.
previous researchers.

9

This result has been observed by

Where I differ from the others is over the welfare interpre-

tation of these patterns, which we now examine.
Proposition 4.

The various welfare approaches give different evaluations of the

desirability of modern sector enlargement growth.

(a) The absolute income and absolute

poverty approaches rate this type of growth as an unambiguous welfare improvement.
9

In his original study [ 20] Kuznets produced a number of numerical examples
consistent with the inverted-U pattern in modern sector enlargement growth, using
as his measure of relative inequality the difference in percentage shares between
the first and fifth quintiles. He did not, however, establish its inevitability
(under the same maintained assumptions as those employed here). After the first
draft of this paper was completed, I learned that the result in Proposition 3.d
had been proven earlier by Swamy [ 34] using the coefficient of variation. The
result has since been reconfirmed, apparently independently, bv Robinson [ 28]
using the log variance.
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(b) Rawlsians would be indifferent to this type of growth.

(c) The relative in

equality .approach regards this type of growth ambiguously in the early stages but
once the turning point is reached, it is a good thing.

(d) The general welfare

approach (12) considers modern sector enlargement growth as an unambiguous improve
ment regardless of the stage of development.
The proofs of (a)-(c) are immediate given the respective welfare functions
and the patterns established in Propostion 3.
(A), (C), (F), and (G).

Point (d) follows from (12) and conditions

The lack of correspondence between (c) and (d) merits

further attention.
Kuznets, Swamy, Robinson, and many others have interpreted the inverted-U
pattern as signifying that in a true economic sense "the distribution of income must
get worse before it gets better."

It would seem at first that a falling share going

to the poor (S) or a rising Gini coefficient (G) should receive negative weight in a
social welfare judgment, possibly negative enough to outweigh the rising level of in
come.

But why?

There are at least two possible answers.

Implicitly, we may have in mind that a falling Sor rising G implies that the
poor are getting absolutely poorer while the rich are getting absolutely richer, and
many of us would regard this as a bad thing indeed.

The problem with this notion

is that it confuses cause and effect, that is to say, absolute emiseration of the
poor would definitely imply falling Sand rising G, but as we have j"st seen, G rises
and S falls in the early stages of modern sector enlargement growth without the poor
becoming worse off in absolute terms.
Ruling out the necessity of absolute emiseration of the poor as a reason for
reacting adversely to a falling Sor rising Gin modern sector enlargement growth, we
may instead have in mind relative income comparisons -- that a growing income dif
ferential betwren rich and poor reduces poor people's utilities.

Yet, in the early

stages of modern sector enlargement growth, despite the rising Gini coefficient and

\

\
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the falling share of the poorest 40%, the income differential between rich and poor
is not changing.

Hence:

Proposition 5.

For modern sector enlargement growth, the conventional relative

inequality measures do not "correctly" measure relative inequality, if the "correct"
definition of relative inequality in dualistic development is the intersectoral wage
difference or ratio(or a monotonic transformation thereof).

In the early stages of

modern sector enlargement growth, we may misled into thinking that relative inequality
is "worsening" when in fact the wage structure is not changing.

This same point holds

in reverse for relative inequality "improvements" in the later stages of modern sector
enlargement growth. This is because condition (E) is violated.
Proposition 5 implies that rising relative inequality as measured by conventional
indices may be a perfectly natural, and even highly desirable, outcome for this type
of development.

Put differently, the falling share of the lowest 40% and rising Gini

coefficient wnich arise in this case are statistical artifacts without social welfare
content.

For this type of growth, the specification of social welfare functions like

(4) conflicts with our ideas of social well-being as given by (12).

This conflict is

particularly acute for persons who wish to give heavy weight to relative income con
siderations.

If relative-inequality-av erse persons compare Gini coefficients or in

come shares of the poorest 40% at two points in time when modern sector enlargement
growth is taking place, they will be led to social welfare judgments which they
themselves would not wish to make.

Unfortunately, functions like (4) based on G or

Sare being used with increasing frequency in current empirical studies of economic
development.

The use of functions like (12), based on the enlargement and -enrich

ment components of various sectors' growth experiences, would avoid such difficulties.
VI. Conclusions and Implications
This paper has examined the welfare implications of different types or dualistic
economic development.
structed (Section II).

Three stylized models of growth in the dual economy were con
Several alternative approaches for assessing the welfare
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TABLE 2.

SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTION AND WELFARE EFFECTS IN THREE MODELS
OF DUALISTIC DEVELOPMENT

Traditional Sector
Enrichment Growth

Modern Sector
Enrichment
Growth

Phase I

Modern Sector Enlargement Growth
Phase III
Phase II

W-wt
-w'1-wt

~-wt< fm < 60%

fm

>

60%

-w'1-wt

Growth and Distributional Effects
fm

Unchanged

Unchanged

Rises

Rises

ft

Unchanged

Unchanged

Falls

Falls

Falls

Rises

-w'1
wt

Unchanged

Rises

Unchanged

Unchanged

Unchangec

Rises

Unchanged

Unchanged

Unchanged

Unchangec

y

Rises

Rises

Rises

Rises

Rises
Falls

'1T

Falls

Unchanged

Falls

Falls

L

Lorenz-superior

Lorenz-inferior

Lorenz-crossing

Lorenzcrossing

Lorenzcrossing

G

Falls

Rises

Rises

Falls

Falls

s

Rises

Falls

Falls

Falls

Rises

ymin

Rises

Unchanged

Unchanged

Unchanged

Unchangec

Absolute Income Approach

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguous
Improvement

Uriambiguc
ImprovemE

Rawlsian Maximin
Approach

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unchanged

Unchanged

Unchanged

Unchangec

Absolute Poverty
Approach

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unchanged

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unainbiguous
Improvement

Unambiguc
ImprovemE

Lorenz-inferior

Lorenz-crossing

Lorenzcrossing

Lorenzcrossing

Welfare Effects
According To:

Relative Inequality
Approach:
L

Unambiguous
Improvement

G

Unambiguous
Improvement

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguc
Improveme

s

Unambiguous
Improvement

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

Ambiguous

Unambiguo
Improveme

fn. (12) and
condition (C')

Unambiguous
Improvement

Ambiguous

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguo
Improveme

Unambiguous
Improvement

Ambiguous

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguous
Improvement

Unambiguo
Improveme

:;eneral Welfare Approach
(12)
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implic ations of growth were set forth (Sectio ns III and IV).

For each stylize d

develop ment typolog y, the changes in relativ e inequa lity and absolu
te incomes and
poverty and the welfare effects of these changes were derived accordi
ng to the various
welfare criter ia (Sectio n V).
A number of conclus ions and implic ations may be drawn:
(1) The time paths of relativ e inequa lity and absolu te poverty depend
on t h e ~
of econom ic develop ment as well as its level. Absolu te poverty is
diminis hed intra
ditiona l sector enrichm ent growth and modern sector enlarge ment growth
, but is not
allevia ted in modern sector enrichm ent growth .

Relativ e inequa lity decline s intra

ditiona l sector enrichm ent growth and rises in modern sector enrichm
ent growth .

The

usual relativ e inequa lity measure s show an inverte d-U pattern in modern
sector en
largem ent growth .

In short, contrar y to Kuznet s' [20] sugges tion, income distrib ution

need not get worse before it gets better , provide d a suitabl e develop
ment strateg y is
followe d.
(2) The absolu te income and poverty and relativ e inequa lity approac
hes often do

not give the same welfare judgme nts about the desira bility of differe
nt pattern s of
growth .

Only for traditi onal sector enrichm ent growth and for the later stages
of

modern sector enlarge ment growth do these approac hes concur in indicat
ing an unam
biguous welfar e improve ment.

In the case of modern sector enrichm ent growth , there

is a real substa ntive disagre ement about whethe r or not growth of
that sort is a
good thing.

~oweve r, in the early stages of modern sector enlarge ment growth ,
there

arises a discrep ancy between the various approa ches, but it has no
appare nt welfare
econom ic basis.

This is becaus e:

(3) Conven tional relativ e inequa lity measur es show an inverte d-U pattern
in
modern sector enlarge ment growth despite a consta nt interse ctoral
wage st~uctu re.
This implies that the "worsen ing" inequa lity (as ordina rily measure
d) shou2J not
be interpr eted as a bad thing, nor should the subseq uent "improv ement"
be regarde d as
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an econom ically-m eaningf ul reducti on in relativ e inequa lity either.

Thus, social

welfar e functio ns, whethe r explic itly-st ated or implic itly-as sumed ,
of the form
W = W(Y, I), f

1

> O, f

2

< 0, where I is any of the Lorenz curve-b ased relativ e

inequa lity measur es in common use, are invalid for this type of growth.

In cases

of modern sector enlarge ment growth , it is far better to look only at
the rate at
which the growth is taking place.
As a corolla ry of the above:
(4) Before we can legitim ately interpr et a rising relativ e inequa
lity coeffic ient

in a country as an econom ically-m eaningf ul worsen ing of the income distrib
ution rather
than a statist ical artifa ct, we must know which of the three types of
econom ic de
velopm ent pattern s that country has been followi ng.

We have shown that a falling

share of income receive d by the poores t 40% and rising Gini coeffic ient
can be the
result of:
(a) Traditi onal Sector Impove rishmen t, which is clearly bad in social
welfar e terms;
or.
(b) Modern Sector Enrichm ent, which is good in absolu te income terms,
indiffe rent
in absolu te poverty terms, and ambigu ous in relativ e income terms; or
(c) Modern Sector Enlarge ment in the early phases , which is good accordi
ng to
widely accepte d axioma tic judgem ents.

Simple calcula tions of relativ e inequa lity

pattern s cannot disting uish among these causes.

This implie s:

(5) Regard less of whethe r one favors an absolu te or relativ e approac
h or some
combin ation of them, social welfare judgme nts about the desira bility
of a given course
of econom ic develop ment should be made on the basis of the enlarge ment
and enrichm ent
compon ents of that growth .

Equatio n (12) makes clear that the way we feel about a

countr y's growth pattern depend s on changes in its wage structu re and
occupa tional
structu re over ·:he develop ment period .

For exampl e, a ten percen t rate of growth of

income in the modern sector might result from either (i) a 20% rise
in the size of
sector , coupled with a 10% fall in average income s, or (ii) a 20% rise
in average

-24incomes, accompanied by a 10% decline in number of persons in the sector.

Most

observers would have very different qualitative evaluations of the two situations.
Hence, examination of the rates of growth of incomes in various sectors of an economy
10
does not provide sufficient information for a welfare judgment.
(6) For persons who wish to give greatest emphasis to the alleviation of absolute
poverty, the poverty index proposed by Sen [30 ] has a number of desirable properties.
It avoids the problems associated with the interpretation of relative inequality
measures.

It is sensitive to the number of poor (the enlargement effect), the severity

of their poverty (the enrichment effect), and the degree of income inequality among
them.

It is easily calculable from microeconomic data or sufficiently disaggregated

tabulations.

And its axiomatic justification is clearly delineated so that users

and non-users alike will know what welfare judgments underlie the measure.
VII. Empirical Significance
The preceding analysis has shown that under certain circumstances the

absolute

poverty and relative inequality approaches may give very different results concerning
the distributional effects of growth in the dual economy.

In light of these differences,

the choice between the two types of measures should be based on the type of welfare
judgments we wish to make.

The empirical significance of the choice may be illustrated

with reference to two actual cases of particular interest, India and Brazil.
The Brazilian economy achieved a growth in per capita income of 32% over the
decade of the 1960s, a substantial accomplishment by the standards of less developed
countries.

Fishlow [ 16 ] , Langoni [ 23 ] , and others have examined the distributional

question of who received the benefits of this growth, found greater relative income
inequality, and concluded that the poor benefited very little, if at all. Yet when the
distributional question is reexamined from an absolute poverty perspective by looking at
lO Consider statements of the fonr. "Income of the richest X% grew by A% but income
of the poorest Y% grew by only B% (lrss than A); therefore, income growth was-dis
proportionately concentrated in the upper income groups." This interpret~tion is
correct if average income among those who were originally the richest X% of the people
rose much fastfr than among those who were originally the poorest Y%. HowLver, the
interpretation is incorrect if what mainly happened was that the high income sector
expanded to include more people. From data on income growth of the richest X%
and poorest Y%, we cannot tell which.
•

-25-

the number of very poor and the levels of income they receive, it is found that the
average real incomes among families defined as poor by Brazilian standards increased by as
such as 60% while the comparable figure for non-poor families was around 25% (Fields
(15 ]).
somewhat.

At the same time, the percentage of families below the poverty line fell
It would thus appear that by assigning heavy weight to changes in the

usual indices of relative income inequality and interpreting these increases as
offsets to the well-being brought about by growth, previous investigators may have
inadvertently overlooked important tendencies toward the alleviation of poverty.
In the India case, the problem is just the opposite.

Bardhan [ 4] reports that

relative inequality in India has actually declined in recent years, which some might
see as an improvement in income distribution.

Yet, due to the lack of growth of the

Indian economy, the precentage of people living in absolute poverty increased in both
the urban and rural sectors of the economy.
These examples indicate that the choice of an evaluative criterion does make a
very real qualitative difference.

It comes down to a choice between welfare judgments

which emphasize the alleviation of absolute poverty or those focusing on the narrowing
of relative income inequality.

Personally, I am most concerned about the all~viation

of economic misery among the very poorest, and therefore prefer the absolute poverty
approach.

Others with different value judgments who may be more concerned than I

with relative income comparisons or with the middle or upper end of the income distri
bution may wish to give relatively greater weight to one of the other approaches.
The inconsistency

between the professed concerns of many researchers for the allevia

tion of poverty and their usage of relative inequality measures in empirical research
is striking and hopefully will be diminished in the not too distant future.
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In this appendix, we prove the inevitability of the inverted-U pattern in
modern.sector enlargement growth with within-sector inequality, taking as our
measure of inequality the Gini coefficient. 1

The strategy of the proof is to

derive an expression for the change in the Gini coefficient with an increase
in the size of the modern sector when there is within-sector inequality, and
then to demonstrate that a maximum value always exists for a positive fraction
of the population, irregardless of the relative sizes of the within-sector
inequality coefficients.
Let us suppose that modern sector· enlargement growth takes place
under the following conditions:
(i) The income distribution within the modern sector is fixed, that
· is, the frequency distribution of wages in that sector (Fm) remains the
same over time, which implies that the mean wage earned by those in the
modern sector (\~m) and the Gini coefficient of those working in the modern
sector (G

m~•:

) also are constant.

(ii) Similarly, the income distribution within the traditional sector,
t
t
t·'•
and therefore F, W, and G "also remain constant.
(iii) The lowest income in ·the modern sector is greater than the
highest income in the traditional sector. 2
(iv) Population is constant and nonnaliz_ed at l; the population
shares of the modern and traditional sectors are given by

r~

and ft,

respectively.
(v) Growth takes place by enlargine the modern sector, i.e., by

1The

choice of the Gini coefficient is arbitrary; any other ine:;_ua1ity
measure might also have been chosen. T:-ie Cini coefficic:nt is considered
here, because it is the most ,.1idely used.
2 1°h.

.
' not crucia
. l to t11e
i
.
b t i. t. grea tl y
is assumption
is
ana 1 ysis,
,u·
cases tl1e algebra.
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increasing fm.
The methodology here draws on a procedure developed by Fei and Ranis
[ 13]

for decomposing total inequality into its various component parts.

Suppose that we were to array the p9pulation in increasing order of income.
· Then Fei and Ranis show:
(A.l)

G

=

I
i

Gi

(A.2)

,

lGi'

. 1. ' ,

1

- GR

and therefore,

(A.3)

G

-

. . .'
l ~G R
1

1

1

i

where

G

= Gini coefficient of total income,

Gi

= Gini coefficient of income from the i'th source, including
those who have no income from that source,
= Share of the i'th factor or sector in total income,

~i

Ri' = Rank correlation between the total incomes of individuals
or groups and their incomes from the i'th source,
1•

G

I

= "Pseudo-Gini coefficient" of the i'th income source, obtained

by computing a Gini coefficient with the individuals or groups
ordered according to total income rather than income from
that source,

Fei and Ranis have applied this procedure to the decomposition -.f total
inequality into its various factor components.
The same methodology, appropriately modified, may be applied to the
growth of various sectors.

Under the conditions of modern sector enlarge

ment growth just assumed, in particular condition (iii), it follows that
Gi' = Gi and Ri' = l for ~11 i, and therefore (A.1)-(A.3) reduce to

using the true Gini coeffic ients instead of the_pseu do-Ginis .
Suppose now that as in the dualist ic developm ent models, we have only
two sectors , a modern sector and traditio nal sector, with respecti ve income
distribu tions --/11 and Ft, and compris ing fm and ft percent of the labor force
respect ively.

The factor share of each sector is the average wage multipli ed

by the fraction of the labor force in that sector, all divided by total income,
which gives us in place of (A.4):
(A. 5)

G =

Recall that the sector Gini coeffic ients Gm and Gt include pe1,sons
with no income from that source.

Letting Gm~·: and Gt~·: represe nt the Gini

coeffic ients includin g only people with income from that sector, and assuming
the two sectors to be mutuall y exclusiv e, it may be shown
that
m~':

(A. 6)

G

=

Gm-r.t

Gt*

and

1-ft

=

Gt-fm

3

1-£111

3
The Gini coeffic ient of a variable Xis equal to l-2B, where Bis the
area under the Lorenz curve of X. It is easily establis hed geometr ically that,
1 l

B = - :.C X +
2 n 1

x2

x.+1<rrl)

J
+
+ • • • + Xn) /Y + _.._..,..,...._
Y

(X. l+X. 2)(!:.)
J+
n
y J+

+ •• • +

(X.+l+ ••• +x )(.::.)
J
n n
y

where n is the total number of persons or familie s, j is the nL ber who have no
income from that source, and Y is total income. The above· express ion may be
rearrang ed to yield

1
B =
2n + nly [(n - j - l)X.J+ l + (n - j - 2)X.J+·2 + ••• + Xn ].
If we now conside r only the n-j persons who have positive incomes from that
source, and let G* be the Gini coeffic ient among those same n-j persons , then
G* = l - 2B*, where
2 (~-j) + (n=j)Y [(n-j-l) Xj+l + (n-j-2)X j+?. + •.• + Xn ].
Denote the term in bracket s by Z.

Then
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We now wish to solve for Gin terms of the parameters of the model

and the proportion of workers in the modern sector labor force.

Solving

(A.6) for Gm and Gt and substituting the results along with Y = wm£111 + Wtft
and ft = 1 - £111 into (A.5), we obtain
(A. 7)

Wm£11l(Gm,'rfm+l-fm) + (Wt -~:;tfrn)(Gt,i_Gt,"£=

111+£111)
G=---- --------------Wrnfm + wt - wt?
2

£111 (w11Grn* -

w11 + WtGt* - Wt)

+£=111(w11~2W~Gt* + Wt)

=------ -------- --

·where

-mm*

A = WG

:-.m

- ;

-t t
+ WG

-l:

-t

- W

'i'he Kuznets turning point exists if G has an interior maximtml, i.e. ,

if the fii~st der·ivative attains a zero value at a critical value of ~,
1
0 < fm
C < •
(A. 8)

Differentiating (A. 7) with respect to £111, we obtain
clG

2
Y[2£111A + BJ - [£111 A + fmB + WtGt*][Wm-Wt]
y2

Equating (4 ,8\) to zero and rearranging yields
. 2

~ [A(Wm-wt)J + ~[2AWt]

+ [BWt - (Wm -flt )WtG t,':] =
1
n

0

2Z
nY

G=l----

and

~ _ l
G·~-

1
---n-j

2Z
(n-j )Y •

Solving these two equations for Z, equating the resulting expressions to one
ctn other, and sol vine the result for G:·., we obtain

Q.E.D.

'

-3vApplyi ng the quadr atic formu la and combi nine tenns, we find

4A 2wt

(A.10)

~

=

- 4ABw11wt + 4Aif1 wtGt*
2
-SAW m.-.t
w Gt* + 4ABW-t 2 + 4AW t 3Gt*
2A(w11
Wt)

-t

-2AW ±

C

Since A< O, the denom inator of (A.10) is negati ve and the first
term in
the numer ator is positi ve.

I f ~ is to lie betwee n O and 1, the numer ator

must be negat ive, and theref ore the only poten tially meani ngful
root is
2
2
A2wt - ABw11wt + Awm wtGt*
2

-t
£1::1 = -w
C
:-.m -t

(A.11)

-2Aw11wt Gt*+ ABWt

w -W

2

3

+ AWt Gt*

A(w-111 - wt>

If the critic al value (A.11)

be positi ve a.,d less than one.

is to be econo micall y releva nt, it must

Denoti ng the term under the square root sign

by C, ~C will be positi ve if C

>

(AWt) 2 , which is easily demon strated :
>

(A.12)

C-(AW t )

=

-ABO t +

+ABWt

2

Aw112Wt GtA
O

-

2An

t2

•
Gt·(

3
+ AWt Gt*

2
2
= -ABWt(Wm-Wt) + AWtGt*cw11 -2w11wt+wt )

= A\l(wm-Wt)[-B+Gt\w11-wt)J
1
= Awtnr11-wt)(W m+\l){ 1-Gt ~)

To show ~ is less than one, we requir e
(A.13)

-tf -

rc
·- <
A

le
A

-m
w

<

wm -

wt

>

o.

'
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which may be shown as follows:

2

2

-t Gt* + 2w-Jn-t
Bw:-JTl-t
W - :-JTI
w W
W Gt*
;-,t2
-t3 ti:
Bw
- W G

as was to be proved.
We have therefore shown that when there is within-sector inequality

in modern sector enlargement growth, there is always an inverted U-pattern
of measured inequality, regardless of whether incomes are distributed more
equally, less equally, or the same within the modern sector as in the tra
ditional sector.

m*

case G

t'':

= G

It shouJ.d be noted that Proposition (3.d) is '..-he special

= O.
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